Information Note on the Court’s case-law No. 99

July 2007

Stankov v. Bulgaria - 68490/01

Judgment 12.7.2007 [Section V]

Article 6

Civil proceedings

Article 6-1

Access to court

Order requiring claimant in a civil action to pay court fees calculated as a percentage of any part of his claim that was disallowed: violation

Facts: As interpreted by the domestic courts, the State Responsibility for Damage Act 1988 (the Act) requires a plaintiff in proceedings against the State to pay court fees if all or part of his claim is dismissed, the amount payable being 4% of the value of the failed part of the claim. Thus, if a claim is found to be excessive, the plaintiff may end up having to pay more in court fees than he is awarded in damages. There is no provision for judicial discretion and considerations of equity play no role in determining the fees due. The applicant successfully sued the State for unlawful detention and was awarded damages. However, pursuant to the Act he was ordered to pay court fees equal to approximately 90% of the damages award. His appeals to the appellate court and the Court of Cassation were dismissed.

Law: The main issue was whether, as alleged by the applicant, excessive court fees had hampered his right of access to a court. In practical terms, the imposition of a considerable financial burden after the conclusion of the proceedings could act as a restriction on the right to a court. Such a restriction was not compatible with Article 6 § 1 unless it pursued a legitimate aim and was proportionate. It was accepted that the imposition of court fees was an aim compatible with the good administration of justice. As to whether the restriction was proportionate, the Government had not suggested that the applicant’s claim for non-pecuniary damage was vexatious, grossly exaggerated or abusive. Moreover, non-pecuniary damage was inherently difficult to assess. The applicant could not, therefore, be criticised for having made the claim he did. The financial burden was particularly significant because the legislation imposed a flat 4% rate with no upper limit and no room for judicial discretion. Further, the fact that claimants were not required to pay the court fees in advance had removed any “cautioning effect”. Various procedural solutions used in other member States, such as reducing or waiving court fees in actions in damages against the State or affording the courts a discretion in determining costs, were absent. In sum, the practical difficulties in assessing the likely award under the Act, taken together with the relatively high and wholly inflexible rate of court fees, amounted to a disproportionate restriction on the applicant’s right to a court.

Conclusion: violation (unanimously).